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EVIDENCE-STATUTORY RAPE-RrGHT OF AccusBD TO COMPULSORY BLOOD
TEST OF PROSECUTRIX AND CmLn-Defendant was convicted of statutory rape
on the strength of complaining witness' uncorroborated testimony. Testimony
of the prosecutrix was to the effect that she had had sexual relations with defendant only once, that she had become pregnant and had given birth to a child
prior to the trial, and that she had had sexual relations with no other men.
Defendant moved for an order requiring that blood tests be taken of the child
and the mother. The motion was denied. On appeal, held, affirmed. Assuming
power, absent statute, to compel the taking of blood-grouping tests, the trial
court did not err since defendant did not offer to submit himself to the test and
without him the tests could prov~ nothing. Furthermore, the record did not
reveal the date of birth, present existence of, or jurisdiction of the court over,
the child. State v. Eli, (N.D. 1954) 62 N.W. (2d) 469.
''In one specific biological trait, viz. blood-groups, scientific opinion is now
in accord in accepting the fact that there is a causative relation between the
trait of the progenitor and the trait of the progeny.''1 However, "this trait can
be used only negatively, i.e. to evidence that a particular man P is not the
father of a particular child C."2 The courts are not in accord as to the power
to compel the taking of these tests. There seems to be sufficient authority
recognizing judicial power, in civil cases, to compel the parties to submit to the
ordinary type of physical examinations.3 The South Dakota court recognized
that a blood-grouping test may be ordered in an appropriate case although an
order for such test was denied because of scientific uncertainty at that time. 4
A lower New York court also had no difficulty in recognizing such judicial
power,5 but this opinion was reversed by the appellate division. 6 An Ohio

11 WmMoRB, EVIDENCE, 3d ed., §165a, p. 610 (1940).
2lbid.
3 See 15 L.R.A. (n.s.) 663 (1908).
4 State v. Damm, 62 S.D. 123, 252 N.W. 7 (1933). See also 163 A.L.R. 939 at
943 (1946).
5 Beuschel v. Monowitz, 151 Misc. 899, 271 N.Y.S. 277 (1934).
6 241 App. Div. 888 (1934). The court felt that such power was lacking since the
child was not a party to the action (civil action for carnal abuse) and would not benefit
from the test. This is a questionable conclusion since a witness is often not a party to the
action. Appeal was denied on grounds of a non-final order. 265 N.Y. 509, 193 N.E. 295
(1934).
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court, in ordering a blood test in a bastardy proceeding,7 said, "The absence
of statutory authority is not conclusive. On the other hand, the Legislature
has not undertaken to limit the court in exercise of such power."8 The Delaware Supreme Court affirmed the granting of a motion by a defendant accused
of statutory rape to order a physical examination of the prosecuting witness,9
and the same has been done by the Oklahoma court.10 These decisions demonstrate an awareness of the necessity of obtaining and introducing evidence
which bears on the truth. 11 If the state can subject witnesses to the inconvenience of attending trials in the first instance, it is strangely inconsistent
to deny to it the right to elicit pertinent testimony by applying to them reasonable physical tests. Measures which are more drastic than blood extraction
are often resorted to by courts, as when witnesses are jailed to avoid Bight, or
plaintiffs are physically examined in personal injury actions, or sensitivity tests
are applied to plaintiffs claiming paralysis.12 Despite these parallels, there is
still a reluctance to utilize blood-grouping tests. Such indisposition on the part
of the courts seems unwananted. The test itself is harmless and virtually painless. A properly supervised blood test should easily surmount the constitutional
barriers conjured up by its opponents.13 One might expect that a court would
welcome all useful evidence, especially in trials for rape, where the word of
the complaining witness often constitutes the sole evidence for the state, and
where a conviction may spell disaster for the defendant The principal case
epitomized the point. Had defendant's motion been granted, he might have
succeeded in establishing non-paternity in direct contradiction to positive assertions by the prosecutrix. This, of itself, would not prove that defendant, did
not have sexual intercourse with prosecutrix, but it would serve to impeach her
credibility very seriously. If the blood tests proved non-paternity, the jury
7 State ex rel.
8 Id. at 450.

Van Camp v. Welling, 22 Ohio L. Abs. 448, 3 Ohio Supp. 333 (1936).
Said the court, "It is our view that the granting of this order comes
within the inherent power of the court." Ibid. The court felt the issue was procedural
instead of substantive. See also State v. Damm, 64 S.D. 309 at 315, 266 N.W. 667
(1933): "It is our position that a statute can neither add to nor detract from the inherent
powers of the court in such a matter."
9 State v. Pucca, 20 Del. 71, 55 A. 831 (1902).
lOWalker v. State, 12 Okla. Cr. 179, 153 P. 209 (1915). In State v. Driver, 88
W.Va. 479, 107 S.E. 189 (1921), the court expressed doubt as to the authority to compel
an examination without the female's consent. Professor Wigmore has said that "the ruling
is fundamentally unsound, and especially for cases of sexual offenses of any sort." 8
WxcMoRE, EVIDENCE, 3d ed., 170n. (1940).
11 See 8 WxcMORE, EvmENcE, 3d ed., §2216 (1940).
12 23 N.Y. UNIV. L.Q. RBv. 156 at 160 (1948). " .•• of the jurisdictions which have
had the opportunity to pass upon the subject, (Calif., Conn., Fla., Me., Md., Mass., N.J.,
N.Y., Ohio, Pa., S.D., Wis., and the Dist. of Col.), only Penn. and N.Y. have refused to
order the tests without a statute." Id. at 161. See Lee, ''Blood Tests for Paternity," 12
A.B.A.J. 441 (1926).
13 See generally, 8 WxcMoRE, EVIDENCE, 3d ed., §§2194, 2216, 2220, 2265 (1940).
See also Maguire, "A Survey of Blood Group Decisions and Legislation in the American
Law of Evidence," 16 So. CAL. L. RBv. 161 (1943). But cf. Schock, "Determination of
Paternity by Blood-Grouping Tests: The European Experience," 16 So. CAL. L. RBv. 177
at 187 (1943).
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would have good cause to question the reliability of prosecutrix' testimony,
or, if the jury believed her testimony that she had engaged only once in sexual
intercourse, and the blood tests proved non-paternity, then defendant would be
acquitted. The court attempted to justify the denial of defendant's motion on
very technical grounds, viz., that defendant did not offer himself to be tested,
nor did he show the date of birth of the child or its present existence and
jurisdictional status. Surely these determinations could have been made with
ease had the appellate court been willing to face the real issue-whether the
trial court had power to order the tests-and conclude it affirmatively. Such
resort to technicalities on the part of an appellate court evidences a lack of desire
to settle a very important issue.
Edward Pastucha, S.Ed.

